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I. BACKGROUND  
Currently, Louisiana law imposes a peremptive period of one 
year on putative fathers seeking to file paternity actions where their 
biological child is presumed to be the child of another.1 However, 
the law allows a mother to assert an action contesting a former hus-
band’s paternity and prove her current husband is the father of her 
 
 ∗   J.D. candidate (May 2021) Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State 
University. This case note was prepared under the tutelage of Professor Clare 
Ryan. 
 1. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 198 (2020) states the current rule governing a 
father’s action to establish paternity and the restricted one-year peremptive period. 
Article 3458 explains that “[p]eremption is a period of time fixed by the law for 
the existence of a right. Unless timely exercised, the right is extinguished upon 
the expiration of the peremptive period.” Typically, putative father refers to the 
alleged biological child of a father of a child born out of wedlock. See Father, 
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). However, in this case note, the term “pu-
tative father” refers to a father seeking to establish paternity of a child who is 
legally presumed to be the child of another man. A paternity action, commonly 
referred to as a paternity suit, is a court proceeding to determine whether a person 
is the father of a child. Paternity suit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 




child within a two-year window.2 Is that fair? Or is the one-year dif-
ference a violation of the putative father’s equal protection rights as 
articulated in the federal and state constitutions? Although the puta-
tive, and biological, father of a young child argued that the existing 
law constituted a violation of his equal protection rights as afforded 
in the U.S. Constitution as well as the Louisiana Constitution, the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed.3  
In August 2012, Danielle Gotreaux Leger gave birth to a child 
while married to Michael J. Leger, II.4 Pursuant to Louisiana Civil 
Code article 185, which states the “husband of the mother is pre-
sumed to be the father of a child born during the marriage,” the child 
was presumed to be the legal offspring of Mr. Leger. However, un-
beknownst to Mr. Leger, the child was actually the offspring of his 
wife’s paramour—John Fontenot.5 Though it is not entirely clear 
from the record when Mr. Leger became aware of his wife’s infidel-
ity, the couple remained legally married for another four years after 
the child’s birth. Mr. Leger did not initiate divorce proceedings until 
May of 2016.6  
When Mr. Leger commenced divorce proceedings, Mr. Fontenot 
seized the chance to intervene and assert his paternity rights as the 
biological father of the minor child born during Leger’s marriage.7 
Mr. Fontenot alleged that DNA testing “established he was the bio-
logical father of the minor child” and explained he was “unable to 
 
 2. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 193 (2020). 
 3. Michael J. Leger, II v. Danielle Gotreaux Leger, 17-270 (La. App. 3 Cir. 
12/6/17); 258 So. 3d 624.  
 4. Id. at 625. 
 5. Id. at 625. 
 6. Leger, 258 So. 3d at 625. 
 7. Id. Mr. Fontenot intervened in the couple’s divorce proceedings as al-
lowed by LA CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1091(3) (2020), which allows a third 
person with an interest in a pending legal action to “enforce a right related to or 
connected with the object of the pending action against one or more of the parties” 
by “opposing both the plaintiff and the defendant.” He intervened during the di-
vorce proceedings in order to assert his legal parentage of the minor child born 
during the Leger’s marriage. 




timely file the avowal action pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code arti-
cle 198.”8 Louisiana Civil Code article 198 states as follows:  
A man may institute an action to establish his paternity of a 
child at any time except as provided in this Article. The ac-
tion is strictly personal.  
If the child is presumed to be the child of another man, the 
action shall be instituted within one year from the day of the 
birth of the child. Nevertheless, if the mother in bad faith 
deceived the father of the child regarding his paternity, the 
action shall be instituted within one year from the day the 
father knew or should have known of his paternity, or within 
ten years from the day of the birth of the child, whichever 
first occurs.  
In all cases, the action shall be instituted no later than one 
year from the day of the death of the child.  
The time periods in this article are peremptive (emphasis 
added). 
While intervening, the putative father acknowledged that his at-
tempt to formally assert paternity was past the mandated peremptive 
period.9 However, Mr. Fontenot argued that the bad-faith exception 
applied to his circumstances.10 The paramour explained that he de-
layed in asserting his parental rights due to “concerns for the safety 
of both Ms. Leger and the child” if the child’s true paternity was 
revealed during the marriage.11 He even produced proof of attempts 
to covertly seek joint custody by presenting a petition for joint cus-
tody and child support filed in a separate trial court proceeding in 
February of 2014.12 Still, the trial court declined to grant Mr. Fon-
tenot an extension on the peremptive period on the basis of bad 
faith.13  
In response to the trial court’s denial of his attempts to assert 
paternity, Mr. Fontenot filed a “Petition to Declare Louisiana Civil 
Code article 198 Unconstitutional” under the same docket as the 
 
 8. Id.  
 9. Leger, 258 So. 3d at 626. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. at 625. 
 13. Id. 




Leger’s divorce proceedings.14 In that action, Mr. Fontenot “named 
Mr. and Ms. Leger, as well as the State of Louisiana, through the 
Attorney General, as defendants.”15 In Mr. Fontenot’s petition, he 
referenced the “fundamental right of parents to make decisions con-
cerning the care, custody, and control of their children” and alleged 
the one-year peremptive period within Louisiana Civil Code article 
198 was “unconstitutionally short and an undue interference with 
[his] constitutionally protected rights as a parent of the minor child” 
as recognized in Troxel v. Granville.16 
Mr. Fontenot’s petition also highlighted Louisiana Civil Code 
article 193 which “allows a mother to institute an action to disavow 
a presumed father and establish paternity of the biological father as 
long as she institutes the action within two years of the date of the 
birth of the child” where the presumed father was the mother’s for-
mer husband and the biological father is her current husband.17 In 
his action, Mr. Fontenot lamented that the disparity in the amount of 
time afforded to a mother compared to the time afforded a putative 
father to bring a disavowal action “violated his rights of equal pro-
tection both of Louisiana Constitutional article 1, §3, and U.S. Con-
stitutional Amendment XIV, §1.”18 He contended there was no rea-
sonable justification for “granting an extra year for the mother of a 
child to bring an action to establish the paternity of the biological 
father than for the biological father himself.”19 Consequently, 
Mr. Fontenot asked the court to declare Louisiana Civil Code article 
198 unconstitutional, and that he be allowed to establish his pater-
nity as well as assert legal custody of the minor child.20 After this 
 
 14. Id. at 626. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 
(2000). See also Leger, 258 So. 3d at 626 (citing id. and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 
U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972)). 
 17. Id. at 627. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 193 (2020) must be read in light of 
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 192 (2020).  
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 627. 
 20. Id. 




matter was formally submitted to the trial court, the court denied Mr. 
Fontenot’s claim and declared Louisiana Civil Code article 198 con-
stitutional.21 Mr. Fontenot appealed that holding to the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeal.22  
II. DECISION OF THE COURT 
On appeal, the Third Circuit delivered two pertinent holdings in 
this case. First, the court stated that Louisiana Civil Code article 198 
“did not violate [the] equal protection clause of [the] state or federal 
constitution, even though a mother’s action to contest a former hus-
band’s paternity of her child . . . could be filed within two years of 
the child’s birth.”23 The court reasoned that the difference in time 
afforded had a reasonable basis, and explained “a mother contesting 
both a former husband’s paternity and attempting to establish her 
current husband’s paternity” in accordance with Louisiana Civil 
Code article 193 “faced different circumstances and consequences 
than a putative father attempting to establish his paternity.”24 Sec-
ond, the court also held that “it is possible for parties to be treated 
differently without violation of equal protection rights; equal pro-
tection of all claimants in all circumstances is not required, as the 
law merely requires equal application in similar circumstances.”25 
For that reason, the court held Louisiana Civil Code article 198 does 
not violate the equal protection clause of the state or federal consti-
tution.26 
The Third Circuit’s denial of Mr. Fontenot’s rights conforms to 
well-established case law regarding the limited rights of putative fa-
thers. In the case of Michael H. v. Gerald D., the United States Su-
preme Court “declined to recognize a biological father’s interest in 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. at 624. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe”: Disestab-
lishment of Paternity, 48 AKRON L. REV. 263 (2015). 
 26. Leger, 258 So. 3d at 624. 




maintaining a relationship with his daughter, born as a result of an 
adulterous affair with the mother who was then married to another 
man.”27 Mr. Fontenot was in an identical predicament in Leger v. 
Leger. In Michael H., the Supreme Court refused to “recognize the 
biological father’s Fourth Amendment due process or liberty inter-
est in the maintaining a relationship with his child.”28 
Likewise, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal found no merit in 
Mr. Fontenot’s argument that the short peremptive period in Louisi-
ana Civil Code article 198 violated his due process rights.29 Because 
Mr. Fontenot’s due process rights were not violated, the lower 
court’s refusal to allow him to establish paternity and denial of cus-
todial rights was constitutional.  
III. COMMENTARY 
The commentary will explain Mr. Fontenot’s restricted rights to 
assert parentage as a putative father under Louisiana Civil Code ar-
ticle 198 in accordance with federal regulations mandating state pro-
cedures for establishment and disestablishment of paternity. The 
one-year peremptive period in the aforementioned article reflects 
federal practices as well.30 Whether or not the law governing dises-
tablishment of paternity should change in light of modern DNA test-
ing is a related and contested issue shrouded in debate. The policy 
motivations for the short temporal limitation on an avowal action 
under Louisiana Civil Code article 198 will also be discussed.  
As mandated in section 666(a)(5), Title 42, United States Code, 
states must create “procedures to establish, rescind, or challenge pa-
ternity.”31 Accordingly, Louisiana Civil Code article 198 provides a 
mechanism for the establishment of paternity as required by federal 
law.32 Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also 
 
 27. Browne-Barbour, supra note 25, at 276. 
 28. Id. at 276-277. 
 29. Leger, 258 So. 3d at 629. 
 30. 42 U.S.C.§ 666(a)(5) (2006). 
 31. Browne-Barbour, supra note 25, at 291. 
 32. Id. 




“incorporates a one-year limitation of action period for claims based 
upon fraud, mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, or 
newly discovered evidence.”33 Similarly, Louisiana Civil Code arti-
cle 198 also imposes a one-year limitation on putative fathers bring-
ing an action to disestablish paternity, mirroring the federal regula-
tion. 
A. The Role of DNA Testing in Modern Actions for Disestablish-
ment and Establishment of Paternity 
Mr. Fontenot’s use of DNA testing to prove his paternity is in-
dicative of a growing concern regarding the role of genetic testing 
in cases where paternity is disputed. Generally, “commentators 
agree that disestablishment [or establishment of paternity] requires 
the balancing of the interests of the affected parties.”34 Surely, mod-
ern DNA testing provides a level of certainty regarding paternity not 
previously afforded to presumed fathers such as Mr. Leger and pu-
tative fathers such as Mr. Fontenot. However, the role which DNA 
testing should play in determining the outcome of legal battles re-
mains uncertain.35 Because disestablishment of paternity by a non-
biological father “legally severs the parent-child relationship” until 
the child is eighteen, at which time the child can choose to have a 
relationship with a putative father of their own volition, the role 
DNA testing should play in determining who is entitled to custody 
and visitation rights remains contested.36  
There are two competing arguments regarding the role DNA 
testing should play in establishing or disestablishing parental rights. 
Some commentators argue “biological proof of non-paternity should 
cause the balancing process to favor the non-biological father’s in-
terests [in disestablishing paternity] over others, including the best 
 
 33. Id. at 292. 
 34. Id. at 288-289. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 264. 




interests of the child.”37 Advocates of this rule are primarily con-
cerned with the issue of fairness, and argue DNA testing is valid 
grounds for disestablishing paternity obligations.38 It seems unjust 
to make a man financially responsible for a child with whom he is 
not biologically related. There is also a concern that the presumptive 
father is legally bound to the parent-child relationship “based upon 
fraud, a material mistake of fact, or other misrepresentation.”39 This 
line of reasoning focuses upon the rights of the established father 
and are the primary motivations for granting paternity disestablish-
ment.40 
Instead of mandating legal obligations based solely on biologi-
cal connections, some argue “courts should place more weight on 
maintaining stability in an established parent-child relationship, de-
spite the potential for a loving and supportive relationship with the 
biological father.”41 Here, proponents contend a “child’s right to 
have a relationship with his or her paternal family should be compa-
rable to the child’s right to have a relationship with his or her ma-
ternal family.”42 Therefore, a court should focus on the existing ties 
between a child and the father seeking to establish or disestablish 
paternity as opposed to allowing DNA results to be dispositive of 
legal obligations and visitation rights.43 
Moreover, scholars argue mandating a parent-child relationship 
is contrary to the best interests of the child.44 These legal theorists 
argue that creating legal rules which establish rights for biological 
fathers will be harmful to the child both emotionally and finan-
cially.45 In other words, a “disestablishment of paternity order not 
only severs permanently a child’s legally recognized relations with 
 
 37. Browne-Barbour, at 289. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 290. 
 45. Id. at 288. 




a man previously deemed to be [his or] her father, but also termi-
nates financial support obligations associated with that parent-child 
relationship.”46 These commentators are concerned with the com-
plicated and potentially disastrous nature of reallocating parental 
rights after a familial bond, regardless of biological ties, is estab-
lished. This line of reasoning seeks to preserve an intact family unit 
regardless of biological links and appears to be the ideology behind 
the Third Circuit’s decision in Leger. 
In its analysis, the Leger court emphasized that “the minor child 
lived in an ‘intact family structure’ with Mr. Leger as the presump-
tive father.”47 The Third Circuit did not consider Mr. Fontenot’s ev-
idence of a biological tie to the young child a persuasive factor when 
assessing his claim. In fact, the court only mentioned the DNA evi-
dence proving Mr. Leger was the biological father once in its deci-
sion.48  
B. Policy Motivations for the Peremptive Period on Avowal Ac-
tions 
In Leger, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal’s reasoning suggests 
the peremptive period articulated in Louisiana Civil Code article 
198 is necessary to preserve public policy interests in maintaining 
intact families. The court explained Mr. Fontenot’s failure to timely 
file an avowal action was contrary to the “policy statement con-
tained in Louisiana Civil Code article 198, comment (e),” providing 
that the limitation period protects a child “from the upheaval of such 
litigation and its consequences in circumstances where the child 
may actually live in an existing intact family with his mother and 
presumed father or may have become attached over many years to 
the man presumed to be his father.”49 The court also chastised Mr. 
Fontenot for failing to properly establish that the “minor child did 
 
 46. Id. at 288. 
 47. Leger, 258 So. 3d at 628. 
 48. Id. at 625. 
 49. Id. at 628. 




not or could not have become attached to Mr. Leger between the 
August 2012 birth and the filing of the avowal action in June 2014,” 
indicating that a successful avowal action would effectively prove 
that there is no attachment between the minor child and presumptive 
father.50 The court’s rationale in denying Mr. Fontenot’s claim 
demonstrates the hefty burden required to rebut the presumptive pa-
ternity of a husband in accordance with Louisiana Civil Code article 
185. 
In conclusion, though the one-year peremptive period in Louisi-
ana Civil Code article 198 restricting a putative father’s right to 
bring a paternity action appears (at least facially) a violation of his 
equal protection rights when compared to the rights of mothers un-
der Louisiana Civil Code article 192, it is not. As the Third Circuit 
noted, a putative father under Louisiana Civil Code article 198 is not 
similarly situated to a mother seeking to contest a former husband’s 
paternity and prove her current husband is the father of her child 
pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code articles 192 and 193.51 To state the 
matter plainly, Mrs. Leger’s maternity rights regarding the young 
child were never challenged, which contrasts greatly with Mr. Fon-
tenot’s struggle to assert paternity rights. Mr. Fontenot, in contrast 
to a mother contesting paternity under Louisiana Civil Code articles 
192 and 193, was not married to the child’s biological parent and 
seeking to rebut the legal presumption of parentage of a former 
spouse. In order for Louisiana Civil Code article 198 to be found 
unconstitutional, a civil code article extending a longer peremptive 
period for putative mothers would need to exist.52  
In accordance with state and federal law, the Third Circuit’s rea-
soning was sound in the case at issue. In light of modern familial 
structures and the policy motivations protecting intact family units, 
 
 50. Id. at 629. 
 51. Id. at 628. 
 52. Black’s Law dictionary does not include the term “putative mother,” 
which indeed sounds purely hypothetical. However, in this context, the phrase 
refers to a mother seeking to assert parental rights where her child is presumed to 
be the child of another woman.  




the Third Circuit’s decision to avoid allocating parental rights based 
solely on DNA evidence was wise and well poised. Leger v. Leger, 
in a manner analogous to Michael H. v. Herald G., restricts a puta-
tive father’s rights and illustrates the “remaining power of the pa-
rental presumption” of parentage within marriage as well as the 
“stigma of sexual conduct outside the marital relationship.”53 This 
case serves as a clear warning to those with married lovers; file an 
avowal action within the one-year peremptive period stipulated in 
Louisiana Civil Code article 198 or forfeit custodial rights to any 
offspring of that relationship.  
 
 
 53. Browne-Barbour, supra note 25, at 277. 
